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The issue of depositor insurance has great immediacy and saliency in Japan today. After March 31, 2002 the 
government's unlimited guarantee of all deposits is scheduled to revert to 10 million yen (about $95,000) per 
depositor in each bank. Three major concerns will accompany this transition. First, a number of weaker 
banks will fail as the bad loan problems are gradually resolved. Second, if deposit insurance is limited, then 
weak hanks will be made even weaker by depositor withdrawals in favor of deposits in stronger banks, or 
other financial assets, and hence are even more likely to fail. Third, until March 31, 2002 government finan-
cial aid to assist the merger of weak financial institutions can be greater than the amount of formal deposit 
insurance coverage. On March 23, 2000, the Center on Japanese Economy and Business and the Mitsui 
USA Foundation, co-sponsored a symposium to discuss whether Japan should develop and maintain market 
discipline on banks to reduce moral hazard, or to provide additional deposit insurance coverage, or other 
forms of guarantees for depositors and even banks. The symposium featured Professor Mitsuhiro Fukao of Keio 
University and Curtis Milhaupt, Fuyo Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Japanese Legal Studies 
at Columbia Law School. Frederick Mishkin, Alfred Lerner Professor of Banking and Financial Institutions, 
Columbia University, and David Weinstein, Carl S. Shoup Professor of the Japanese Economy served as com-
mentators. The symposium was moderated by Professor Hugh Patrick. Excerpts of their presentations are pre-
sented below along with highlights of the intrapanel discussion. 
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Currently pending before the 
Diet is legislation that would 
re-institute the cap on deposit 
insurance in Japan and create 
permanent legal mechanisms to 
resolve insolvent banks. The leg-
islation is a culmination of 
many complex and interrelated 
events with a long history. I 
think this legislation needs to be 
understood in historical context 
and placed within the larger 
debate about bank safety nets 
that is ongoing in Japan and 
other parts of the world. 
Context is crucially impor-
tant on several different levels. 
First, in reading Japanese edito-
rials on the "payoff problem," I 
was struck by how often com-
mentators suggested that limit-
ing deposit insurance would 
have a destabilizing impact on 
the Japanese financial system, 
without any reference to the fact 
that Japan had limited deposit 
insurance from 1971 to 1996. 
The historical record is impor-
tant to the current policy debate 
Second, Japan can and should 
learn from its own experience 
with deposit insurance. 
Reflecting on what has tran-
spired provides some grounds 
for optimism and some areas of 
concern in connection with the 
new legislative proposals. Third, 
Japan's experience with deposit 
insurance is instructive on the 
larger debate about bank safety 
nets and deposit insurance. I 
would like to begin with this 
third point. 
As you know, there is a long 
standing theoretical and policy 
debate about deposit insurance 
in the U.S. For a time, deposit 
insurance was thought to be one 
of the most successful of the 
New Deal programs. That eval-
uation changed dramatically 
after the banking and Savings 
and Loan crises of the 1980s. 
Now, deposit insurance is associ-
ated with moral hazard and reg-
ulatory forbearance. Ironically, 
deposit insurance actually 
increases the risk of bank failure 
once a bank has fallen into finan-
cial difficulty, because its share-
holders and managers have 
incentives to gamble on high-risk 
projects. If the project succeeds, 
the shareholders are rewarded 
and the managers keep their 
jobs. If the project fails, the bank 
becomes the taxpayers' problem. 
Not surprisingly, the policy con-
clusions from the U.S. debate are 
that government sponsored 
deposit insurance should be 
eliminated and privatized. It is 
important to note that many of 
the policy recommendations are 
based only on the U.S. experi-
ence with deposit insurance. 
Japan offers some additional 
insights into this debate. 
Japan's experience with the 
governance of bank distress can 
be divided into three periods for 
purposes of analysis. First, an 
implicit safety net was in effect 
for most of the postwar period, 
until about 1991. (From 1971 
to 1996, there was an explicit 
deposit insurance system in 
place, but it was entirely sym-
bolic and did not play a role in 
the resolution of bank distress.) 
The real insurance came implic-
itly from the Ministry of 
Finance. This informal safety 
net was supported by the entire 
institutional, regulatory, and 
political regime in Japan. The 
Deposit Insurance Corporation 
was very poorly funded and 
staffed; it could not have 
resolved a failing bank even if it 
had been designed to do so. The 
role contemplated for the 
Deposit Insurance Corporation 
was extremely limited—simply 
paying off depositors of failed 
banks. The Ministry of Finance's 
reputation was very important 
in this informal safety net. The 
political dominance of the LDP 
during this period provided 
assurances that the informal "no 
failure" norm in the banking 
industry would not be violated. 
Interestingly, the formal insti-
tutional structure actually moti-
vated informal bank work-outs 
in two ways. First, unlike U.S. 
banking law, Japanese law did 
not have any special provisions 
for bank insolvency. The law 
contemplated that failing banks 
would simply go through the 
corporate bankruptcy process. 
This is unworkable, however, 
because banks trigger deposit 
runs as soon as they signal that 
they are distressed. Second, the 
Deposit Insurance Law did not 
contemplate that the deposit 
insurance corporation would 
play a role in providing financial 
assistance for mergers. The law 
was changed in 1986, but stated 
that financial assistance had to 
be limited to the hypothetical 
cost of paying off depositors. 
Thus, the Ministry of Finance 
actually had incentives to bypass 
the legal system and provide for 
informal workouts. 
In the second stage of 
Japanese deposit insurance, 
approximately 1991-1998, the 
informal safety net broke down. 
The financial problems in the 
banking industry became too 
severe to be handled on an ad 
hoc and entirely informal basis. 
The Ministry of Finance was 
unable to find willing merger 
partners for failing banks, due in 
part to the fact that an outburst 
of derivative litigation had made 
Japanese bank managers con-
scious of their legal liability to 
their shareholders. The reputa-
tion of the Ministry of Finance 
began to unravel due to a variety 
of scandals. Perhaps most 
importantly, market sentiment 
turned decidedly against the 
informal safety net in the form 
of the Japan premium, which 
was clearly a market premium 
for the unusual systemic risk 
brought about by the informal 
safety net. 
The third stage, which began 
in approximately 1996, is a 
period of institutionalization of 
the safety net. Several important 
developments during this 
period indicate a shift toward 
more formal, law-based meth-
ods of resolving bank distress. 
First, a system of "prompt cor-
rective action" was instituted in 
1996. This system, which is 
based on U.S. law, is designed 
to eliminate politically palatable 
but economically disastrous reg-
ulatory forbearance. Regulators 
are now required to take 
increasingly stringent steps with 
respect to banks in financial dis-
tress, which is measured by 
objective criteria. For the first 
time there are legal constraints 
on the ability of Japanese regu-
lators to remain passive in the 
face of serious problems in the 
banking industry. 
Second, there have been 
major reforms of bank supervi-
sory agencies in Japan. Much of 
the oversight authority of the 
Ministry of Finance has been 
transferred to other regulatory 
agencies. Third, banking legisla-
tion enacted in 1998 (set to 
expire in 2001, prompting the 
current "payoff" debate) installed 
for the first time a legal regime 
for insolvent bank resolution. 
The final step in this process is 
the banking legislation currently 
pending before the Diet. 
I would like to highlight two 
major features of this legislation. 
It reinstitutes the 10 million yen 
cap on deposit insurance, sub-
ject to a systemic risk exception 
similar to the exception that 
exists in U.S. law. I will say 
more about this exception in a 
minute. The legislation also 
contemplates a U.S.-style put-
chase and assumption method 
of dealing with failing banks. 
Under the P&A system, a failing 
bank is identified through regu-
latory inspections and a willing 
buyer is found for the "clean" 
assets of that bank. The buyer 
takes on the clean assets and all 
liabilities of the bank, leaving 
the "dirty" assets for the Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. This 
system minimizes outlays by the 
deposit insurance fund and pro-
vides for prompt resolution of 
the failing bank. In most cases, 
the regulators enter the bank on 
Friday afternoon, and it reopens 
under new management on 
Monday morning. 
What do we learn from this 
brief review? First, explicit 
deposit insurance played no role 
in Japan's financial crisis. All of 
the moral hazard and forbear-
ance effects that contributed to 
Japan's banking problems can be 
placed on the doorstep of the 
informal safety net. I think it 
suggests that the alternative to 
deposit insurance is not market 
discipline of banks, which is the 
common assumption in the lit-
erature in the U.S. about 
deposit insurance. Rather, the 
real world alternatives are a bank 
safety net that is institutional-
ized and formalized in law, and 
a bank safety net that is oper-
ated informally at the discretion 
of bank regulators. Given that 
real world choice, I think a for-
mal system is fat preferable to 
an informal system. 
Further, I think our focus 
should shift from deposit insur-
ance per se to bank closure. It 
does not matter very much 
whether Japanese depositors are 
protected up to 5 million yen or 
15 million yen. Small depositors 
lack the information and expert-
ise to monitor bank manage-
ment anyway, so protecting 
them in and of itself is not 
problematic. What matters is 
whether a government has credi-
ble bank closure policies in 
place. Market principles can 
operate in tandem with deposit 
insurance if bank shareholders, 
managers, and large depositors 
know that they will be penalized 
in the event the bank fails. 
I think developments in Japan 
are very encouraging, but signifi-
cant questions remain that can 
only be resolved with time. For 
example, can the purchase and 
assumption system function 
effectively in Japan? This system 
requires accurate and prompt dis-
closure of financial problems, pri-
marily through bank inspections. 
Japan has yet to prove that it has 
a viable bank inspection system. 
Second, in order to encourage 
bidding on a failing bank's assets, 
potential buyers need confidence 
that what they purchase are in 
fact good assets. That confidence 
is provided through a realistic 
loan classification and bank 
examination system. Again, Japan 
has yet to prove that this system 
exists. A second area of concern is 
the system risk exception. The 
legislation provides that in a "cri-
sis situation," a special committee 
headed by the Prime Minister can 
provide unlimited deposit insur-
ance protection, special cap-ital 
contributions and other benefits 
to a failing bank. The problem is 
that "crisis situation" is defined 
very broadly, leaving ample room 
for ill advised or politically moti-
vated bank rescues. 
There arc three problems in the 
current deposit insurance sys-
tem. First, there is no permanent 
bankruptcy code for banks. The 
Financial Revitalization Law 
passed in 1998 will expire in 
March 2001. Second, depositors 
must wait several weeks to with-
draw money from failed institu-
tions. The reason is because a 
depositor identification system is 
lacking. In Japan, there are no 
social security numbers so it is 
difficult to check whether a per-
son has deposited more than 10 
million yen in aggregate. Third, 
the deposit insurance system 
does not cover interests. 
The Financial System 
Council has made five recom-
mendations in their report to 
reform the deposit insurance 
program. First, the coverage of 
the system should be expanded 
to include interest accrued from 
deposits, local government 
deposits, and a portion of bank 
debentures. The postal savings 
system, operated by the govern-
ment, guarantees both the prin-
cipal up to 10 million yen per 
person and its interest. Second, 
liquid deposits will be fully pro-
tected for a limited time. This 
comes as a result of pressure 
from small firms and small 
financial institutions. Third are 
new permanent bankruptcy pro-
cedures for banks. Fourth are 
preparations for a depositor 
identification system in the event 
of bank failures, and fifth, the 
introduction of variable insur-
ance premiums in the future. 
I think there are several 
problems in the Council's 
report. I felt that there was 
strong stage management by the 
Ministry of Finance and the 
presence of vocal observers, who 
are not actual Council members, 
was excessive. Although the 
report recommended the protec-
tion of all liquid deposits, I do 
not think that there was strong 
support for it among the proper 
members of the Council. A pro-
posal for a new Deposit 
Insurance Law followed the 
Council's report. The new law 
effectively postpones the appli-
cation of a minimum cost prin-
ciple from April 2001 to April 
2003 . The law actually states a 
one-year postponement of the 
application of a minimum cost 
principle, but I think it is two 
years because a full guarantee of 
liquid deposits will continue 
until March 2003. 
There is also a systemic risk 
exception that will be decided by 
a new Financial Risk Manage-
ment Committee. They will 
probably develop a system simi-
lar to the one in the U.S. The 
Committee will be comprised of 
the Prime Minister, the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, the Minister 
on Financial System, the Mini-
ster of the Treasury, the Head of 
the Finance Agency, and the 
Governor of the Bank of Japan. 
What are the remaining 
problems in the Japanese deposit 
insurance system? First, Japan 
needs a variable deposit insur-
ance premium to avoid moral 
hazard problems. Second, it is 
necessary to eliminate insolvent 
financial institutions, such as 
weak regional banks, credit 
unions, and agricultural cooper-
atives. Third, is the removal of 
the full protection of liquid 
deposits. The full protection of 
liquid deposit is not a good idea 
because it may destabilize fragile 
banks by inducing anxious 
depositors to shift from their 
time deposit to liquid deposit. 
Fourth, how does one control 
the Postal Saving System? The 
Postal Saving System is fully 
guaranteed by the government 
up to 10 million yen, they pay 
no local business or corporate 
tax, and remain outside the 
deposit insurance system. Fifth, 
there are many dormant 
accounts at banks with no main-
tenance charges, only Citibank 
charges. Sixth, stronger internal 
and external auditing is very 
important. Currently, major 
Japanese banks pay about 
0.3-0.5 million dollars per year 
for external auditing. This is less 
than one-tenth of the amount of 
U.S. banks. Large U.S. banks 
pay about 5-25 million dollars 
per year. 
It is very important to be aware 
of both the legal and cultural 
aspects of the deposit insurance 
systems we implement. Certain 
things that we might advocate in 
the U.S. context might be inap-
propriate in the context of 
another country with a very dif-
ferent way of doing things. As I 
have advocated elsewhere, in the 
U.S. having more ambiguity as 
to whether depositors will be 
paid off might limit moral haz-
ard. However, in the Japanese 
context, it might very well do 
the opposite because it likely 
would result in a blanket guar-
antee which would create serious 
a serious moral hazard problem. 
We also need to recognize 
that deposit insurance is not the 
same thing as a safety net. A 
strong safety net is not contin-
gent upon whether a deposit 
insurance system has been 
implemented or not. There are 
many countries which did not 
have explicit deposit insurance 
and yet it was clear to the banks 
and the public that if a serious 
crisis did emerge, everyone 
would be bailed out. This often 
results in banks taking great 
risks. For example, the deposit 
insurance system in Scandinavia 
was almost nonexistent and yet 
everyone knew that there would 
be a full bailout if a problem 
occurred, with the result that 
banks took huge risks when 
financial liberalization occurred. 
The key point is that one 
must understand that a safety 
net will almost surely be in place 
regardless of whether one has 
deposit insurance or not. With 
respect to Japan, the real prob-
lem was that there was a blanket 
deposit insurance guarantee 
with little concern about limits. 
Some claim that if deposit 
insurance is eliminated banks 
can engage in many different 
activities and the market will 
provide the appropriate disci-
pline to keep banks from taking 
excessive risks. I disagree. I do 
not know of any country in the 
world that will not bailout its 
banking system if it gets into 
trouble, even where there is no 
deposit insurance. 
A second important issue is 
whether bank institutions that 
do not have enough net worth 
should be closed down? With 
low net worth, banks know they 
have nothing to lose by taking 
risks. What we have seen is that 
the safety net means that people 
realize that their deposits are 
protected and negative net insti-
tutions will take huge risks 
which eventually hit the tax 
payers very heavily because they 
can still get deposits. The real 
issue is that there must be credi-
ble bank closure policies. 
With respect to the purchase 
and assumption system, I am 
concerned that it might be 
problematic. Before the FDICIA 
Act in 1991, all closures of 
banks were done with a pur-
chase and assumption method-
ology. This meant that all 
depositors were bailed out 100 
percent, creating a severe moral 
hazard problem. The change in 
law in FDICIA enacted a lease 
cost resolution method which 
sometimes used purchase and 
assumption but often used liqui-
dation which imposed costs on 
large uninsured depositors and 
creditors. The key point is that 
bank closure should impose 
costs on large depositors and 
creditors when the taxpayer suf-
fers losses. 
I think the systemic risk 
exception is a very good feature 
of the U.S. prompt corrective 
action legislation which came 
into being with the FDICIA Act 
of 1991. I think the issue here 
relates to an active debate in 
monetary economics called the 
Rules versus Discretion debate. 
Rules can prevent people from 
engaging in time-inconsistent 
behavior in which policymakers 
pursue short-run policies that 
will lead to problems in the long 
run. This is a very serious issue 
for financial supervision. 
Regulators have a tendency to 
sweep things under the rug 
because they hope things will 
blow up only after they have 
moved to another job or instead 
hope that they will get lucky 
and the system will recover. 
However, rules suffer from 
the problem that one can not 
always figure out all of the con-
tingencies. As a result, there are 
cases where just applying the 
rules in a rigid fashion will get 
one in trouble. Thus, many pol-
icy-makers think we should have 
a lot of discretion. The problem 
is that discretion leads to time-
inconsistent behavior. How does 
one deal with this? The answer 
is to set up a a set of rules which 
should be violated only in 
highly unusual circumstances, 
but if they are violated it must 
be very transparent. This was 
the idea of the systemic risk 
exception in the U.S. context. 
Will the systemic risk excep-
tion work as well in Japan as it 
has in the U.S.? In the U.S. 
there is tremendous scrutiny if 
one goes public which will in 
fact impose the proper con-
straint that only under very 
unusual circumstances will the 
systemic risk exception be 
implemented. This type of 
transparency may not operate as 
well in Japan. This is why I feel 
culture really matters when deal-
ing with these kinds of issues. 
Theoretically, the problem 
with depositor insurance is not 
that it exists, but that premiums 
are not suitably adjusted for 
risk. If one could appropriately 
assess how much risk a banking 
institution was taking and could 
appropriately charge for it, then 
the incentive for them to engage 
in moral hazard would be elimi-
nated. Indeed, we do not find 
there as a serious moral hazard 
problem with private insurance 
arrangements because there is 
premiums are appropriately 
adjusted for risk. Unfortunately, 
designing appropriate risk-based 
premiums for deposit insurance 
is very hard to achieve. 
One of the things that have led 
to the current financial crisis 
was the question of how the 
Japanese government was going 
to liberalize its financial market. 
The dilemma was whether the 
government would follow a 
rapid liberalization policy or a 
gradual policy. In the end, Japan 
adopted a gradual approach, and 
one of the major problems of 
that approach was a host of per-
verse incentives in the Japanese 
financial system. For example, as 
bond markets liberalized good 
clients left their main banks 
leaving the main banks with the 
worst firms. The main banks 
then started to move in to other 
sectors and there was a general 
unraveling of the financial sys-
tem. One answer as to why the 
Japanese government chose this 
method is that it was afraid of 
the repercussions of rapidly lib-
eralizing Japan's financial mar-
kets. How docs the financial sys-
tem liberalize and how does one 
deal with the problems? I do not 
think there are very good 
answers to these questions. 
There are three lessons to 
learn from Japan's experience. 
First, the prewar financial sys-
tem did not have neatly the 
same level of regulation or 
insurance of financial institu-
tions. Second, wild fluctuations 
in Japanese finance did not exist 
prior to World War II. From my 
perspective, it is interesting how 
well the system did without 
insurance or guarantees from 
the government. Third, one 
should not be too afraid of sys-
tems with less insurance. 
With respect to the costs for 
deposit insurance, one question 
is whether the costs of deposit 
insurance are as high as some 
suggest, or are they less and, 
what is the optimal way to con-
trol these costs? Some of the 
costs are 20-30 percent of GNP. 
However, this is not a true eco-
nomic cost. The issue of distri-
bution versus real economic cost 
is one issue. The actual amounts 
of money that are being shifted 
around in the bailouts are far 
smaller than the amounts of 
redistribution that typically 
occur from trade policy inter-
ventions. These are very visible 
transfers and have clear affects 
on the government budget. 
What is the dead weight loss 
associated with this crisis? I 
think it can be estimated by 
what the excess construction was 
as a result of the moral hazard 
and a measure of the price dif-
ferential of what those assets are 
worth today compared to before 
the crisis. My guess is that it 
would be a pretty small number, 
but a much larger number if 
one looks at the dead weight 
loss of the financial disinterme-
diation that has occurred as a 
result of this crisis. 
The real cost of a financial 
crisis is not the money being 
spent by the government, but 
the costs associated with finan-
cial disintermediation. How 
should one design a rescue pack-
age for financial institutions? I 
think one primary objective of a 
policy to bail out financial insti-
tutions is that it be politically 
implemented quickly. Speed is a 
very important factor. The real 
cost of the current crisis may in 
fact be the immense time it took 
for the Japanese government to 
act. It is crucial to design poli-
cies that are likely to politically 
generate fast resolutions even if 
those resolutions are not effi-
cient in terms of dead weight 
loss triangles. 
I am a harsh critic of the 
Postal Savings System. If one 
believes that financial disinter-
mediation is a major problem in 
Japanese financial markets today, 
the one thing that is striking in 
postal savings is the enormous 
increase in lending by govern-
ment financial institutions. 
There is a lot of money flowing 
into the system and a large 
amount of lending coming out 
of the system which may in fact 
be alleviating some of the disin-
termediation that is occurring in 
the private sector. I do not think 
that this is a good long-run 
strategy, but it is a partial solu-
tion to some of the problems in 
the market. 
PATRICK: It seems to me that 
there are two ways to protect 
depositors. One is to have a 
safety net and the other is to 
have a strong banking system so 
a safety net is unnecessary. This 
was implied when the Japanese 
said they needed to get rid of 
the weak banks. Indeed, that 
was the purpose of the prompt 
corrective action approach, 
which was designed to provide 
objective criteria. For example, 
when the net worth of a bank 
falls below two percent, then the 
bank must replenish its capital 
or face being closed down. In 
principle, the approach exists, 
but it has not yet been applied 
in practice. This leads to a very 
important political reality as 
Professor Fukao mentioned. 
There are a number of small, 
very weak institutions that are 
small in terms of their share of 
total deposits, but very strong in 
terms of their geographic distri-
bution and political power. A 
formal guidance approach with-
out actually tackling the prob-
lem is an appeal that pits those 
who would like to liberalize and 
strengthen the economy against 
those who are trying to protect 
their own vested interests. The 
vested interests of the politicians 
in the smaller areas is to protect 
the smaller institutions. 
Consequently, there is a terrible 
political and policy dilemma, 
which is why it is important to 
have transparency in Japan. 
FUKAO: In order to have 100 
percent coverage through 
prompt collective action banks 
need four percent capital. The 
reason is that Japanese banks do 
not own enough profit margins. 
Low profitability is a core prob-
lem and banks have not imple-
mented an internal control 
mechanism to create enough of 
a profit margin to cover poten-
tial future loses from bad loans. 
Second, compared to the regu-
lated banking system the postal 
savings system is better. The pri-
vate sector has not proven to be 
competitive against the postal 
savings system. With respect to 
transparency for systemic excep-
tion, I hope it works. The new 
policy board of the Bank of 
Japan has been issuing fairly 
detailed minutes. If the govern-
ment intervenes it will obvious 
from the outside. In that sense 
Japan is moving toward a more 
transparent system, particularly 
in the decision making process. 
MISHKIN: I also agree that the 
real key costs in Japan arc not 
the transfers of money, but the 
fact that the financial crisis 
stopped the financial system 
from doing its job which is get-
ting funds to people who have 
productive investment opportu-
nities. Japan has had a GDP gap 
on the order of 30 percent of 
GDP because of this. Part of the 
issue is that a quick resolution is 
needed. In the U.S. we put a 
large amount of assets into the 
resolutions trust corporation 
and there was a lot of criticism 
when they were selling off the 
assets quickly because many 
people ended up with good bar-
gains. However, the answer is 
that those assets are much better 
off being put in new hands and 
put into productive use rather 
than just deteriorating. 
I think one mistake made in 
Japan is that no one has been 
punished during the bailouts. 
The public needs to know that 
people are not getting away with 
fraud. One of the characteristics 
of the Japanese system for the 
last decade is that everyone was 
being bailed out, including the 
depositors, large creditors and 
even the stockholders. This is 
actually characteristic of many 
other countries where bailouts 
occur. In the U.S. there has 
been an attempt to punish peo-
ple who engaged in fraudulent 
type activity. 
I think part of the lesson 
moving forward is to keep the 
political process in mind. Japan 
needs to bite the bullet, re-capi-
talize their banking sector and 
get the political support to do it. 
This means going after some 
people and making a cultural 
change. The inherent strengths 
of Japan's economy are extraordi-
nary, but it needs to be tapped. 
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